In a number of influential articles published since 1972, Dorothy Grover has developed the prosentential theory of truth. Brought together and published with a new introduction, these essays are even more impressive as a group than they were as single contributions to philosophy and linguistics. Denying that truth has an explanatory role, the prosentential theory does not address traditional truth issues like belief, meaning, and justification. Instead, it focuses on the grammatical role of the truth predicate and asserts (...) that “it is true” is a prosentence, functioning much as a pronoun does. Grover defends the theory by indicating how it can handle notorious paradoxes like the Liar, as well as by analyzing some English truth-usages. The introduction to the volume surveys traditional theories of truth, including correspondence, pragmatic, and coherence theories. It discusses the essays to come and, finally, considers the implications of the prosentential theory for other theories. Despite the fact that the prosentential theory dismisses the “nature of truth” as a red herring, Grover shows that there are important aspects of traditional truth theories that prosentential theorists have the option of endorsing. (shrink)

In discussing propositional quantifiers we have considered two kinds of variables: variables occupying the argument places of connectives, and variables occupying the argument places of predicates.We began with languages which contained the first kind of variable, i.e., variables taking sentences as substituends. Our first point was that there appear to be no sentences in English that serve as adequate readings of formulas containing propositional quantifiers. Then we showed how a certain natural and illuminating extension of English by prosentences did provide (...) perspicuous readings. The point of introducing prosentences was to provide a way of making clear the grammar of propositional variables: propositional variables have a prosentential character — not a pronominal character. Given this information we were able to show, on the assumption that the grammar of propositional variables in philosopher's English should be determined by their grammar in formal languages (unless a separate account of their grammar is provided), that propositional variables can be used in a grammatically and philosophically acceptable way in philosophers' English. According to our criteria of well-formedness Carnap's semantic definition of truth does not lack an ‘essential’ predicate - despite arguments to the contrary. It also followed from our account of the prosentential character of bound propositional variables that in explaining propositional quantification, sentences should not be construed as names.One matter we have not discussed is whether such quantification should be called ‘propositional’, ‘sentential’, or something else. As our variables do not range over (they are not terms) either propositions, or sentences, each name is inappropriate, given the usual picture of quantification. But we think the relevant question in this context is, are we obtaining generality with respect to propositions, sentences, or something else?Because people have argued that all bound variables must have a pronominal character, we presented and discussed in the third section languages in which the variables take propositional terms as substituends. In our case we included names of propositions, that-clauses, and names of sentences in the set of propositional terms. We made a few comparisons with the languages discussed in the second section. We showed among other things how a truth predicate could be used to obtain generality. In contrast, the languages of the second section, using propositional variables, obtain generality without the use of a truth predicate. (shrink)

Academic debates about pluralism and truth have become increasingly polarized in recent years. One side embraces extreme relativism, deeming any talk of objective truth as philosophically na{ï}ve. The opposition, frequently arguing that any sort of relativism leads to nihilism, insists on an objective notion of truth according to which there is only one true story of the world. Both sides agree that there is no middle path. In Truth in Context, Michael Lynch argues that there is a middle path, one (...) where metaphysical pluralism is consistent with a robust realism about truth. Drawing on the work of Hilary Putnam, W. V. O. Quine, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, among others, Lynch develops an original version of metaphysical pluralism, which he calls relativistic Kantianism. He argues that one can take facts and propositions as relative without implying that our ordinary concept of truth is a relative, epistemic, or "soft" concept. The truths may be relative, but our concept of truth need not be. (shrink)

Most of us, were we faced with a life threatening situation, would try to avoid it; we do not want to die. Yet Lucretius has argued that death can be ‘nothing to us,’ for when death has occurred we don't exist: we can't suffer something if we don't exist.If death can be a misfortune, what is the misfortune suffered, and who suffers it? The misfortune must be suffered by the person who dies, before death has occurred, otherwise – as Lucretius (...) points out – there is no subject to suffer the misfortune. But what kind of misfortune can the misfortune of death be, that a person can suffer it before he or she dies? This question provides the focus of the paper.Our attitudes towards death and life are determined in part by beliefs we have about a variety of things, for example, whether or not there is a life after death. As I shall assume that life ceases at death the attitudes towards death for which I seek explanations will not be universally endorsed; nor are the attitudes towards life, in terms of which the explanations will be given, universally endorsed. My project is not to defend a set of attitudes but to show that the set of attitudes towards life that I consider provide an explanation of a set of attitudes that some people have towards death. (shrink)

Em português: Teorias da verdade: Uma introdução crítica.\nTradução de Alessandro Zir. São Leopoldo: Editora UNISINOS,\n2003. Aquestão da verdade no debate contemporâneo é o\ntema ótimo livro, que explica admiravelmente bem os conceitos\ncentrais da semântica, as dificuldades neles envolvidas e as\ndiversas soluções que são hoje propostas.

In this entry, we offer a very brief overview of Dorothy Grover's prosentential theory of truth.

In spite of a powerful tradition, more than two thousand years old, that in a valid argument the premises must be relevant to the conclusion, twentieth-century logicians neglected the concept of relevance until the publication of Volume I of this monumental work. Since that time relevance logic has achieved an important place in the field of philosophy: Volume II of Entailment brings to a conclusion a powerful and authoritative presentation of the subject by most of the top people working in (...) the area. Originally the aim of Volume II was simply to cover certain topics not treated in the first volume--quantification, for example--or to extend the coverage of certain topics, such as semantics. However, because of the technical progress that has occurred since the publication of the first volume, Volume II now includes other material. The book contains the work of Alasdair Urquhart, who has shown that the principal sentential systems of relevance logic are undecidable, and of Kit Fine, who has demonstrated that, although the first-order systems are incomplete with respect to the conjectured constant domain semantics, they are still complete with respect to a semantics based on "arbitrary objects." Also presented is important work by the other contributing authors, who are Daniel Cohen, Steven Giambrone, Dorothy L. Grover, Anil Gupta, Glen Helman, Errol P. Martin, Michael A. McRobbie, and Stuart Shapiro. Robert G. Wolf's bibliography of 3000 items is a valuable addition to the volume. (shrink)

I begin with an exposition of the two main variants of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT), those of Dorothy Grover et al. and Robert Brandom. Three main types of criticisms are then put forward: (1) material criticisms to the effect that (PT) does not adequately explain the linguistic data, (2) an objection to the effect that no variant of (PT) gives a properly unified account of the various occurrences of "true" in English, and, most importantly, (3) a (...) charge that the comparison with proforms is explanatorily idle. The last objection is that, given a complete semantic account of pronouns, proadjectives, antecedents, etc., together with a complete (PT), the essential semantic character of "true" could be deduced, but then, the idleness of the comparison with pronouns would be apparent. It turns out that objections (2) and (3) are related in the following way: the prosentential terminology is held to conceal the lack of unity in (PT), by describing the different data in the same terms ("proform", "antecedent", etc.). But this, I argue, is only a way of truly describing, rather than explaining, the data, these being certain relations of equivalence and consequence between sentences. I consider a language for which (PT) would be not only true, but also explanatory, but note that this language is very different from English. I end by showing that Robert Brandom's case that "is true" is not a predicate fails, and that his motivation for saying so is based on fallacious reasoning (namely, Boghossian's argument against deflationism). (shrink)

Deflationary theories of truth had two different types of responses to the Liar. A first class of deflationists considers that this paradox does not represent a problem for their theories. On the other hand, other deflationists find the Liar to be a serious issue. This article focuses on the first class. Both Grover and Gupta consider that the Liar does not represent a problem for a deflationary theory of truth. For Grover, the paradox is demolished through the construction (...) of the theory and for Gupta, the Liar is not the problem of the deflationist, but rather it concerns a specialist. Dorothy Grover (2005) is an advocate of the prosentential theory of truth. This theory considers that truth works as a prosentence. The sentence resulted by adding the truth predicate to a referring expression has the same content as the sentence picked out by the initial referring expression. A prosentence does not have a meaning by itself; it takes its meaning from its antecedent. Grover considers that the truth predicate used in the Liar fails to pick up an antecedent, thus it does not have operative meaning. The operative meaning comes from using a word in a specific context. Gupta (2005) considers that a specialist – not a deflationist – should give the proper answers to the paradoxes. A deflationist should not be concerned with how the paradoxes can be avoided. His only interest is how the T-schema should be interpreted in order to give the meaning of the truth predicate and how the deflationary conclusions are reached. Paradoxes do not count in as an issue for deflationists, because they are able to answer to their main questions without facing paradoxes. Therefore, the Liar is not a real issue for the deflationist. The main aim of this article is to offer some counterarguments for these two views. Grover’s difference between dictionary and operative meaning seems to make a distinction between accepted and restricted sentences. This distinction is needed in order to escape the problem of paradoxes. If this is the case, the Liar is an issue, but it is solvable. This is quite different from what Grover claims. On the other hand, Gupta’s approach may ease the deflationist’s work but it might destroy his theory. (shrink)

This paper presents the leading idea of my doctoral dissertation and thus has been shaped by the reactions of all the members of my thesis committee: Charles Chastain, Walter Edelberg, W. Kent Wilson, Dorothy Grover, and Charles Marks. I am especially grateful for the help of Professors Chastain, Edelberg, and Wilson; each worked closely with me at one stage or another in the development of the ideas contained in the present work. Shorter versions of this paper were presented (...) at the 47th Annual Northwest Conference on Philosophy (1995), the 1996 Mid-South Philosophy Conference, the 1997 meeting of the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association, and at the University of Washington, Seattle; thanks to all audiences for their insightful comments and questions and also to my conference commentators, Eric Gampel, Jonathan Cohen, and Bruce Glymour, respectively, each of whom offered a thoughtful critique. Lastly, I extend my gratitude to anonymous referees, including two from Mind and Language, whose remarks led to significant improvements in the paper. Address for correspondence: 13416, 4th Ave. S., Seattle, WA 98168, USA E-mail: [email protected].. (shrink)

In this paper, I use an extension of Russell’s theory of descriptions to give further support to an analysis of truth ascriptions that stems back to Ramsey and has been further developed by Dorothy Grover and Christopher J. F. Williams. It is the view that the truth predicate vanishes in the logical form of the sentences in which it occurs in favour of a combination of quantifiers and propositional variables. I argue that Russell’s theory of descriptions can be (...) used as a technical way of giving flesh to the sometimes-vague characterisation of truth terms as expressive. In my analysis, I assume the Fregean analysis of quantifiers, Frege’s context principle, and the Fregean distinction between grammatical structure and logical form. These three ground-breaking insights are crucial to the Russellian interpretation of denoting phrases and the analysis of truth ascriptions that I advocate. In section one, I explain the sense in which truth is a higher-level concept and which consequences follow from this claim, one of them being the linguistic flexibility of the concept of truth. In section two, I apply Russell’s insights to truth ascriptions and show that the truth predicate dissolves in their logical form in favour of propositional variables and quantifiers. The disappearance of the predicate in the logical form is the precise sense that I give to the claim that truth terms possess expressive meaning. As propositional quantification has been felt as a serious obstacle to the Ramseyian approach, I show in section three that the Quinean arguments usually addressed against higher-order quantification are weaker than the received view has taken them to be. I also address the objection that rests on the normative nature of truth. I argue in section four that the approach to truth ascriptions introduced by Ramsey provides an accurate and technically irreproachable account of the semantic expressivism associated with the concept of truth. (shrink)

The classic and contemporary readings in this collection represent the four most influential theories of truth – correspondence, pragmatist, coherence, and deflationary theories. A collection of classic and contemporary philosophical reflections on the nature of truth. Opens with an introduction to theories of truth, designed for readers with little or no prior knowledge of the subject. Divided into four sections on the most important theories of truth - correspondence, pragmatist, coherence, and deflationary theories. Brings together articles in the recent debate (...) over the correspondence theory and deflationism that are not otherwise available in one place. Includes contributions by C.S. Peirce, William James, Bertrand Russell, Alfred Tarski, Hartry Field, Dorothy Grover, Anil Gupta and others. Concludes with an extensive bibliography of recent articles on truth. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5.

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